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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.1  In passing 
this legislation, Congress attempted to require States that place a burden on an 
individual or group’s “free exercise” of religion to show a compelling State interest 
for doing so.2  The constitutional authorities that Congress relied on in enacting this 
legislation were sections one and five of the Fourteenth Amendment.3  In 1997, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to 
use section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to “control cases and controversies.”4  
Now, despite the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the RFRA, Congress is once 
again trying to protect religion.  On July 15, 1999, the House of Representatives 
passed the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) by a 306-118 vote.5  The RLPA 
has stalled in the Senate, as potential problems with the Bill continue to be debated.  
The RLPA would require courts to overturn federal, state, and local laws which 
unduly burden the exercise of religion, unless the government could show a 
“compelling state interest” for the law, and that the law is the “least restrictive 
means” of promoting that interest.6  Unlike the RFRA, which was premised on the 
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause, the RLPA is premised on Congress’ 
commerce and spending powers.7   
Although the Religious Liberty Protection Act appears, on its face, to be simple, 
there are many constitutional issues which call into question the validity of the 
proposed bill.  This note will focus on the constitutional problems of using Congress’ 
commerce and spending powers to protect religion.  It will examine the problem of 
attaching religious conditions to the States’ receipt of federal funds, and the potential 
problem that may result from using the spending power to protect religious exercise.  
                                                                
142 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993). 
2Id. 
3Section 1 of the amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Section 5 of the 
amendment gives Congress the power to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
[that] article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
4See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the RFRA exceeded 
Congress’ § 5 enforcement powers). 
5Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999). 
6Id. 
7Id. 
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The note then turns to the commerce clause justification for the RLPA.  It will point 
out the major flaw in using the commerce clause to protect religious exercise, 
namely, that religions with little or no commercial component will not be protected 
by the RLPA.  It will also look at the problem of reconciling the RLPA and the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits Congress from passing laws “respecting 
religion.”8  The note will examine a key case in the Establishment Clause area, 
Larson v. Valente.9  It will point out that by protecting those religions that affect 
commerce, and not those that do not, the RLPA is, in effect, a law respecting the 
establishment of religion.  The note will then turn to the effect that the RLPA will 
have on civil rights laws, and the possible unintended consequences of the RLPA.  
Finally, this note will consider the RLPA’s predecessor, the RFRA, as it relates to 
Congress’ power to enforce constitutional rights under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.10 
II.  THE BILL: H.R. 1691- THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT 
A.  The Language of the Proposed Law 
Section 2(a) of the RLPA provides a general rule which reads as follows:  
A government shall not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise: 
(1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that receives 
Federal financial assistance; or (2) in any case in which the substantial 
burden on the person’s religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of 
that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes; even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability.11   
B.  The Two Exceptions Wherein a Government May Burden Religious Exercise 
Section 2(b) of the RLPA lists the exceptions to the general rule set out in 
Section 2(a).  The exceptions apply to instances when a government may 
substantially burden a person’s religious exercise.12  Section 2(b) makes allowances 
for the government to substantially burden a person’s religious exercise if the 
government can demonstrate that application of the burden to the person: “(1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”13   
                                                                
8U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
9456 U.S. 228 (1991). 
10See supra note 3. 
11Religious Liberty Protection Act, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999). 
12Id. at § 2(b). 
13Id. 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE RLPA IS PREMISED 
A.  The Religious Liberty Protection Act as an Exercise of Congress’ 
Spending Power 
Section 2(a) of the RLPA makes the provisions of the Bill applicable to any 
program or activity, operated by a government, that receives Federal financial 
assistance.14  The RLPA defines a “program or activity” by using the same definition 
of the term as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15  It has been held by at least one 
court that actual receipt of federal funds by a particular program or activity is not the 
test of being subject to the conditions attached to those funds; the test, rather, is 
whether the program or activity is part of the operations of a State or local 
government that has received federal financial assistance.16  In other words, the 
program or activity need not itself have received federal financial assistance to be 
bound by the federal “free exercise” condition of the RLPA, but need only be part of 
the operations of a government that has received federal funds in any capacity.17 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution states: “The Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;. . .”18  
The Supreme Court has held that Congress’ power to “provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States” allows Congress the power to 
“authorize expenditure of public monies for public purposes [which] is not limited 
by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”19  The Court 
went on to say, however, that while Congress’ spending power is not limited to 
express grants of power found in the Constitution, it may not use its spending power 
to usurp State powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment.20  Incident to Congress’ 
spending power is its power to attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.21  
Congress has used this power “to further broad policy objectives by conditioning 
                                                                
14Id. at § 2(a)(1). 
15Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: “For the purposes of this subchapter, the 
term “program or activity” and the term “program” meal all of the operations of—(1)(A) a 
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local 
government; or (B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such 
department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance 
is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government; (2)(A) a college, 
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or (B) a 
local educational agency (as defined in section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965), system of vocational education or other school system; . . . any part of 
which is extended federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1964). 
16See Hodges by Hodges v. Public Bldg. Comm’n, 864 F. Supp. 1493 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
17For a more detailed discussion see Kristian D. Whitten, Conditional Federal Spending 
and the States’ “Free Exercise” of the Tenth Amendment, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 5 (1998). 
18U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
19Whitten, supra note 17, at 14 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1935)). 
20Id. 
21See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
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receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory 
and administrative directives.”22 
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a key case on conditional federal spending 
in South Dakota v. Dole.23  In Dole, the Court held that a federal statute conditioning 
states’ receipt of a portion of federal highway funds on the states’ adoption of a 
minimum drinking age of twenty-one was a valid exercise of Congress’ spending 
power.24  In so holding, the Court discussed the general restrictions on Congress’ 
spending power, as articulated in various earlier Supreme Court cases.25  The first of 
these restrictions is that the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the 
“general welfare.”26  The Court noted that in considering whether a particular 
expenditure is intended to serve the general welfare, courts should defer greatly to 
the judgment of Congress.27  The second restriction on Congress’ spending power as 
noted in Dole is that if Congress wishes to condition the States’ receipt of federal 
funds, it “must do so unambiguously…, enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”28  The third 
restriction on the spending power is that conditions on federal grants might be 
illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects 
or programs.”29  Finally, other constitutional provisions may provide an independent 
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.30   
The Dole Court found that the first three limitations did not apply to the federal 
statute at hand.31  The Court concluded that the provision was designed to serve the 
general welfare, the conditions upon which the States were to receive funds were 
clearly stated by Congress, and that the condition was germane to the federal 
purposes.32  In assessing the fourth restriction on the spending power, the Court in 
Dole found that the independent constitutional bar limitation on the federal spending 
power is not “a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress 
is not empowered to achieve directly.”33  The Court found, instead, that the language 
of their earlier opinions “stands for the unexceptional proposition that the power may 
not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
                                                                
22Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). 
23483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
24Id. at 212. 
25Id. at 207. 
26Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)). 
27Id. 
28483 U.S. 207 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17 
(1981)). 
29Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). 
30Id. (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 
(1985)). 
31483 U.S. at 208. 
32Id. 
33Id. at 210. 
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unconstitutional.”34  The Court went on to note that “in some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’.”35  Because the financial inducement at issue 
in the Dole case was a mere 5% of South Dakota’s federal highway funds, the Court 
found it to be only a mild encouragement to the states.36  The Court found that the 
threat of losing such a small portion of highway funds if South Dakota did not 
comply with the twenty-one drinking age did not amount to Congress regulating 
“those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states.”37 
The spending power reliance in the Religious Liberty Protection Act is sure to 
cause problems.  Constitutional scholars have already noted that the only way for 
state and local governments to avoid the RLPA’s mandate would be to forgo all 
federal financial assistance.38  The RLPA is Congress’ attempt to regulate an area 
reserved to the states.  The First Amendment to the Constitution states: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion…”39  This clause of the 
First Amendment, known as the Establishment Clause, is a limitation on Congress’ 
power, and not a delegation of power.  The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 
reserves all powers not delegated to the United States to the States or to the people.40  
In the RLPA, Congress is attempting to regulate an area, namely religion, that is 
reserved to the states.  Forcing states to either accept RLPA’s mandate, or refuse all 
federal financial assistance, “runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment.”41 
Under South Dakota v. Dole, when “the financial inducement offered by 
Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion” there is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ spending power.42  
The Religious Liberty Protection Act is about as coercive as legislation can get.  
State and local governments can either take federal funds with the RLPA liability, or 
take no funds at all.43  Under South Dakota v. Dole, this Act is an unconstitutional 
use of Congress’ spending power. 
The RLPA is also contrary to other restrictions on Congress’ spending power as 
articulated in Dole.  Although the Act was likely intended to serve the general 
                                                                
34Id. 
35Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
36483 U.S. at 211. 
37Whitten, supra note 17, at 19-20. 
38See, e.g., Kristian D. Whitten, Cracks in the Church Wall: Religious Liberty Protection 
Act Would Violate Establishment Clause, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1999, at 17. 
39U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
40Amendment 10 reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
41Whitten, supra note 38. 
42Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
43Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A. 
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
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purposes, it does not unambiguously condition the States receipt of federal funds, as 
is required.44  The RLPA states that “[A] government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s religious exercise in a program or activity, operated by a government, that 
receives Federal financial assistance.”45  This rather unclearly mandates that 
governments comply with the RLPA, or, should they choose not to comply, must 
refuse all federal funds or be subject to the liabilities of the RLPA.   
The RLPA can also be seen as violating another restriction on Congress’ 
spending power as set forth in South Dakota v. Dole: there must be a connection 
between the spending and the condition attached to the spending.46  Dole clearly 
states that conditions on federal funds may be illegitimate if they are unrelated “to 
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.”47  RLPA applies to 
all programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance.48  This may apply 
to anything from federally funded clinics and hospitals to single mothers receiving 
federal welfare checks.  The relationship between these types of federal funds and 
the conditions mandated in the RLPA is tenuous at best. 
B.  The Religious Liberty Protection Act as an Exercise Of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause Power 
In addition to the problems posed by the RLPA’s spending power reliance, there 
are problems raised by the Bill’s reliance on the commerce clause.  Section 2(a)(2) of 
the RLPA prohibits governments from substantially burdening a person’s religious 
exercise “in any case in which the substantial burden on the person’s religious 
exercise affects, or in which a removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes; even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”49  Scholars fear that the 
Bill’s reliance on Congress’ commerce power50 will offer no protection to religious 
free exercise that has little or no commercial component.51  Furthermore, there will 
be many cases in which the effect on commerce cannot be proven, and will therefore 
not be protected by the RLPA.52 
                                                                
44Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
45Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(1). 
46Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
47Id. 
48Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(1). 
49Id. at § 2(a)(2). 
50The Commerce Clause gives the Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3. 
51See Whitten, supra note 38. 
52Id. 
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Because RLPA is not limited to activities that substantially affect commerce, it 
can be seen as exceeding Congress’ power under the commerce clause.53  Under U.S. 
v. Lopez, courts must ask whether a law regulates activities that “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce.54  The Court in Lopez also held that courts must consider the 
“inherent limits of federalism on the exercise of the commerce clause.”55  
Furthermore, Congress cannot use the commerce clause power in a way that would 
“convert congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States.”56   
IV.  THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT  
CLAUSE PROBLEM 
A.  The First Amendment Prohibition on Laws “Respecting Religion” 
Although the RLPA is premised on Congress’ commerce and spending powers, 
some constitutional experts believe that neither justification is sufficient to overcome 
the First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from enacting laws “respecting an 
establishment of religion.”57  Much like its predecessor, the RFRA, the RLPA 
attempts to define the scope of religious free exercise protected by the First 
Amendment, thus violating the Establishment Clause.  The RLPA may be viewed as 
a law that does, in fact, respect religion.  Looking, for example, at the commerce 
clause justification for the RLPA, it would appear that the RLPA is a law respecting 
religion.  The RLPA protects religions that affect commerce, but not religions that do 
not affect commerce.58  This is, in effect, a law “respecting an establishment of 
religion,” and is, therefore, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause.59  The Supreme Court has held that “the clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”60  By protecting those religions that affect interstate 
commerce, and not protecting religions that do not affect interstate commerce, the 
RLPA is clearly preferring one religion over another, in direct violation of the 
Supreme Court’s holding.61 
                                                                
53Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A. 
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
54514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
55Id. at 566. 
56Id. at 567. 
57See Whitten, supra note 38 (quoting, U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
58Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(2). 
59See Whitten, supra note 38. 
60Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1981).  
61See Whitten, supra note 38. 
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B.  Larson v. Valente 
At issue in Larson v. Valente was the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that 
imposed certain registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious 
organizations that solicited greater than fifty percent of their funds from 
nonmembers.62  The statute at issue, the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act63 was 
designed to protect the public from contributing to fraudulent charities, and required 
charities to register and disclose the contributions they received with the Minnesota 
Department of Commerce.64  From the time the Act was passed in 1961, until 1978, 
all “religious organizations” were exempted from the provisions of the Act.65  Then, 
in 1978, the Minnesota Legislature amended the Act to include a “fifty percent 
rule.”66  The rule required that only those religious organizations that received more 
than fifty percent of their total contributions from members or affiliated 
organizations would remain exempt from the registration and reporting requirements 
of the Act.67  Those religious organizations that received fifty percent or less of their 
contributions from members or affiliated organizations would be subject to the 
registration and reporting requirements.68   
Appellee Valente, a member of the Unification Church, brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking a declaration that 
the Act, on its face and as applied to the Unification Church through the so-called 
“fifty-percent rule” constituted an abridgment of their First Amendment rights of 
expression and free exercise of religion, as well as a denial of their right to equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.69  Valente also 
argued that the fifty-percent rule discriminated among religious organizations, and 
thus violated the Establishment Clause.70  The District Court found the Act to be 
facially unconstitutional with respect to religious organizations, and was therefore 
entirely void as to such organizations.71  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that the fifty-percent rule 
violated the Establishment Clause.72  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 
In finding for Valente, the Supreme Court held that the fifty-percent rule of the 
statute clearly granted denominational preferences, and thus declared the statute 
invalid.73  The Court found that the effect of the fifty-percent rule was to impose the 
                                                                
62Larson, 456 U.S. at 230.  
63MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-309.61 (1969).  
64Larson, 456 U.S. at 231. 
65Id. 
66Id. 
67Id. at 232. 
68Id. 
69Id. at 233. 
70Larson, 456 U.S. at 234. 
71Id. at 235. 
72Id. at 237. 
73Id. at 246. 
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registration and reporting requirements of the Act on some religious organizations, 
but not on others.74  The Court noted that had the provisions of the Act been designed 
to operate evenly, on all religions, the registration and reporting requirements would 
have been permissible.75  However, the fifty-percent rule was, in the Court’s words, 
“the selective legislative imposition of burdens and advantages upon particular 
denominations.”76  The Court found that the fifty-percent rule was designed with “the 
explicit intention of including particular religious denominations and excluding 
others.”77  The Court found that the fifty-percent rule in the Act set up the precise 
type of official denominational preference that the Framer’s of the Constitution 
forbade.78  The Court also stated that the constitutional prohibition of denominational 
preferences is “inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free 
Exercise Clause.”79  The Court went on to say that equality of all religions would be 
impossible in the face of official denominational preferences, such as the one at issue 
in Minnesota’s fifty-percent rule.80 
As the Supreme Court noted in Larson v. Valente, the “clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”81  The RLPA allows for an official preference of one 
religious group over another; namely, the preference of those religions that “affect, 
commerce” over those religions that do not.82  The RLPA, therefore, is clearly in 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
C.  Employment Division v. Smith 
In Employment Division v. Smith, respondents Smith and Black were fired by a 
private drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, 
for religious purposes during a ceremony of their Native American Church.83 
Respondents were then denied unemployment compensation by the State of Oregon 
under a state law which disqualified employees discharged for misconduct.84  
                                                                
74Id. at 253. 
75Id. 
76Larson, 456 U.S. at 254. 
77Id. 
78Id. at 255. 
79Id. at 245. 
80Id. 
81Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. 
82Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(2).  
83494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
84Id. Oregon law prohibited the knowing or intentional possession of a “controlled 
substance” unless prescribed by a medical doctor.  OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).  
“Controlled substance” was defined to include drugs classified in Schedules I through V of the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812.  Peyote was included in the 
Schedule I classification, and possession constituted a Class B felony under Oregon law.  OR. 
REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987). 
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Respondents claimed a religious exemption from the Oregon law,85 charging that the 
law prohibited their free exercise of religion.86  The Oregon Supreme Court held that 
the Oregon statute made no exception for the sacramental use of peyote, and that 
Smith and Black’s religious use of the drug was within the prohibition of the 
statute.87  However, the Court went on to find that the prohibition was invalid under 
the Free Exercise Clause, and that the State could not deny employment benefits to 
respondents for having used peyote for a religious purpose.88   The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to examine the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment permits Oregon to include religiously used peyote in its prohibition 
of use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to 
persons dismissed from their jobs because of such use of peyote.89 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court first looked at the history and background of 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court noted that the free exercise of religion means 
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.90  This right 
of free exercise, the Court stated, includes not only the right to believe and profess 
one’s religious doctrine, but also the right to perform (or abstain from performing) 
physical acts based upon those beliefs.91  The Court found that it would be 
unconstitutional for a State to ban such acts or abstentions only when engaged in for 
religious reasons, but not when engaged in for non-religious reasons.92   
The Court then went on to differentiate the above examples from the case at bar.  
The respondents in Smith contended that their religious motivation in using peyote 
placed them beyond the reach of the criminal law, even though the law was not 
specifically directed at their religious practice, and the law was constitutional as 
applied toward those who use the drug for other reasons.93  Respondents further 
argued that “prohibiting the free exercise of religion” included requiring any 
                                                                
85The First Amendment prohibition on laws establishing religion was incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), making that 
amendment applicable to the states.  The Court in Cantwell held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause incorporated the section of the First Amendment that reads, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the free exercise [of religion].  Id. at 303. 
86Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 872. 
87Id. at 876. 
88Id. 
89Id. at 874. 
90Id. at 877. 
91Id. The Court here noted certain types of physical acts that would constitute religious 
free exercise.  They include, among others, assembling for worship, participating in 
sacramental use of bread and wine, or abstaining from eating certain foods. 
92Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 877.  The Court cited instances when action would be 
unconstitutional in this regard.  For example, if a state passed a law that banned the casting of 
statues only when the statue was to be used for worship purposes, the law would be 
unconstitutional. 
93Id. at 878. 
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individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires(or forbids) the 
performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires).94  
In finding for petitioner, the Court held that because respondents’ ingestion of 
peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition was 
constitutional, the State could, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny the 
respondents unemployment compensation when they were dismissed due to the use 
of the drug.95  In so holding, the Court examined their precedents, and found that no 
case had ever held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance 
with an otherwise valid law that prohibits conduct the State is allowed to regulate.96  
The Court looked at a line of cases which held that the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual from an obligation to comply with valid laws of general 
applicability.97  The first such case that the Court looked at was Reynolds v. United 
States.98  In that case, the Court rejected the claim that criminal laws against 
polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to individuals whose religion 
required the practice.99 
The next case the Court looked at was Prince v. Massachusetts,100 wherein the 
Court held that a mother could be prosecuted under child labor laws for using her 
children to dispense literature in the streets, regardless of her religious motivation.101  
Another case the Court looked at was Braunfeld v. Brown,102 in which a Sunday-
closing law was upheld against the claim that it burdened the religious practices of 
persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from working on other days of the 
week.103  The final precedent that the Court looked at was Gillette v. United States,104 
under which the Supreme Court sustained the military Selective Service System 
                                                                
94Id. 
95Id. at 890. 
96Id. at 879.  The Court noted a succinct description of this notion by Justice Frankfurter in 
Minersville School Dist. Bd. Of Ed. V. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940):  
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious 
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.  The mere possession of religious 
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not 
relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilites. 
97Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879.  
9898 U.S. 145 (1879).  
99Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 
(1879)).  
100321 U.S. 158 (1944).   
101Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
171 (1944)).   
102366 U.S. 599 (1961).  
103Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961)). 
104401 U.S. 437 (1971).   
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against the claim that it violated free exercise by compulsorily enrolling persons who 
opposed a particular war on religious grounds.105 
The Court found that the crux of respondents’ argument, that when otherwise 
prohibited conduct is coupled with religious convictions, the conduct must be free 
from governmental regulation, went against all prior Court decisions, as laid out in 
the previously set forth holdings.106  Because the Court found there to be no 
contention that the Oregon drug law was an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the 
rule to which the Court had adhered ever since Reynolds applied, namely, that 
religious practices may be interfered with if the interference results from a valid law 
of general applicability, not designed to target religious beliefs or practices 
directly.107  Respondents argued that although an exemption from generally 
applicable criminal laws need not be automatically given to religiously motivated 
individuals, the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated by the courts 
under the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.108  The 
Sherbert court adopted a balancing test which required states to show a “compelling 
state interest” to justify burdening an individual’s religion.109  The Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith, however, abandoned the Sherbert test, holding that 
generally applicable state laws may be applied to religious practices even when not 
supported by a compelling state interest.110  Furthermore, the Court found that 
although states may allow for a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption for 
otherwise illegal activities (such as ingesting peyote), this exemption is not 
constitutionally required.111 
The RLPA cannot be seen as a religious-practice exemption, as permitted by 
Employment Division v. Smith.  Instead, it is a realignment of power between church 
and state; it forces a state to make accommodations for religion even if the state 
determines that such an accommodation goes against the general welfare.112  The 
RLPA grants privileges to religion over all other interests.113  Congress lacks the 
power to privilege religion in such a way.114  Although the Supreme Court noted in 
                                                                
105Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Gillette v. United State, 401 U.S. 437, 
461 (1971)).  
106Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 882.   
107Id. 
108Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
109Id. 
110Id. at 882.  The Court found that “To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a 
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the state’s 
interest is ‘compelling’- permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto 
himself,’ contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”  Id. at 885 (citing 
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145). 
111Id. at 890. 
112Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A. 
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
113Id. at 371. 
114See id. 
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Smith that certain nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemptions may be 
permissible, it has not given any indication that legislatures have the power to 
privilege religion in such an across-the-board manner as done in the RLPA.115  The 
RLPA is not a permissible accommodation, but rather an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.116 
V. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
A.  Claims Under the Religious Liberty Protection Act May Be Used to 
 Defeat Civil Rights 
The RLPA would provide federal statutory protection for religious exercise to 
replace or increase the constitutional protection which was available before the 
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith lowered the standard of 
review for free exercise claims.117  The RLPA requires that a state or local 
government shall not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise unless the 
government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest for doing so, and that 
the burden is the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.118  The RLPA does not have a provision which specifically addresses its 
potential effect on state and local civil rights laws.119  Many experts worry that an 
unintended consequence of the RLPA will be the use of religious free exercise as a 
defense to civil rights claims.120 
One area protected by civil rights laws, marital status, is sure to face an RLPA 
religious exercise defense.  Many landlords claim that their religious beliefs about 
premarital sex requires them to deny housing to unmarried couples, despite state or 
local fair housing laws which forbid discrimination based on marital status for 
housing.121  The RLPA will allow landlords to use a religious exercise defense in 
                                                                
115Id. 
116Id. 
117494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
118Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong.  
119During the subcommittee discussion on the Religious Liberty Protection Act in the 
105th Congress, Congressman Robert C. Scott offered an amendment to ensure that the RLPA 
would not create any defense to civil rights claims.  The amendment stated that “[n]othing in 
this Act shall be construed to provide a defense to any other civil or criminal action based on 
any Federal, State, or local civil rights law.”  The amendment was rejected by the 
subcommittee, and is not part of the RLPA as it is now written. 
120See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel to the American Civil Liberties 
Union).  In his testimony, Mr. Anders stated, “Our concern [the ACLU] is that some courts 
turn a federal statutory shield for religious exercise into a sword against state and local civil 
rights laws.”    
121Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union). 
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denying housing to unmarried couples, in violation of fair housing laws.122  When 
using standards of review similar to the “compelling governmental interest” standard 
set forth in the RLPA, several courts have recently ruled on cases whereby a 
defendant in a civil rights action defended on the grounds of religious liberty.123 
Defendants in civil rights cases have also used a religious liberty defense in cases 
involving race or sexual orientation.  The World Church of the Creator, for example, 
claims a religious belief in promoting the white race.124  Gay lawyers say the RLPA 
will allow conservative Christian landlords to refuse to rent to gays and lesbians, 
despite state laws protecting homosexuals from housing discrimination.125  In 
Thomas v. Municipality of Anchorage, a landlord of a building in which he was not a 
resident successfully argued that the application of strict scrutiny to the fair housing 
laws would permit him to discriminate against unmarried couples seeking rental.126  
Using the same reasoning, the RLPA may allow conservative Christians and other 
religious people may be allowed to discriminate against homosexuals in housing and 
employment by claiming a religious belief in doing so.127 
B.  Application of the Four-Part RLPA Test to Civil Rights Claims 
The Religious Liberty Protection Act states that: 
A [state or local] government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
religious exercise in a program or activity, operated by a government, that 
receives federal financial assistance [or impose a substantial burden on 
religious exercise if the burden affects interstate commerce], even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability. . . [unless the] 
government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.128 
Therefore, in deciding cases which involves a religious free exercise defense to a 
civil rights claim, courts under the RLPA must apply a four-part test.  First, is the 
defendant’s discrimination a “religious exercise”?129  Second, does the applicable 
state or local anti-discrimination law “substantially burden” the defendant’s religious 
                                                                
122Id. 
123See, e.g., Thomas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the governmental interest in preventing marital status discrimination was not compelling).   
124John Cloud, Law on Bended Knee, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 32. 
125Id. 
126165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).  
127Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A. 
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
128Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. 
129Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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exercise?130  Third, is the government’s interest in eradicating the discrimination 
“compelling”?131  Finally, are uniformly applied anti-discrimination laws the least 
restrictive means of furthering any compelling governmental interest?132 
1.  Is Discrimination “Religious Exercise” Under RLPA? 
Using the Language of the Religious Liberty Protection Act, the first part of the 
test that courts must utilize is to ask whether a refusal to comply with civil rights 
laws is religious exercise.133  The definition of “religious exercise” in the RLPA is 
very broad, allowing any civil rights defendant who can show that his or her 
discriminatory actions were “substantially motivated by religious belief” to meet the 
first prong of the RLPA test.134  Using a similar standard to the one set forth in the 
RLPA, courts have held that the refusal to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple 
based on a landlord’s religious belief that premarital sex is sinful is religious 
exercise.135  In the employment context, courts have held that hiring decisions can be 
deemed religious exercise, if the employer can demonstrate that the decision was 
based on religious belief or doctrine.136   
2.  Do State and Local Civil Rights Statutes “Substantially Burden” Religious 
Exercise? 
The second part of the RLPA test requires that in order for the RLPA protection 
to be available, the state or local law must “substantially burden” an individual’s 
religious exercise.137  The purpose for this part of the RLPA test is to avoid litigation 
over laws which are neutral, or have only a small impact on religious exercise.138  
Congress did not define “substantial burden” as it applies to the RLPA, and there is 
                                                                
130Id. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133Id. 
134The RLPA defines religious exercise as “an act or refusal to act that is substantially 
motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to 
a larger system of religious belief.”  H.R. 1691 § 7(a)(3). 
135See Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).  This 
case was decided when the RFRA, the RLPA’s predecessor was still good law.  The court in 
Smith stated that “while the renting of apartments may not constitute the exercise of religion, if 
Smith claims the laws regulating that activity indirectly coerce her to violate her religious 
beliefs, we cannot avoid testing her claim under the analysis codified in RFRA.”  Id. at 923. 
136See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that a retaliatory action taken by a religious publisher against employee who instituted EEOC 
proceedings alleging sex discrimination was religious exercise because church doctrine 
prohibited lawsuits by members against the church). 
137H.R. 1691 § 2(a). 
138Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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no generally applicable test to determine when a “substantial burden” exists.139  
Circuit Courts, however, have adopted a broad reading of “substantial burden” 
during the years when the RLPA’s predecessor, the RFRA, was in effect.  In Mack v. 
O’Leary, the Seventh Circuit held that: 
A substantial burden on the free exercise of religion [within the meaning 
of the RFRA] is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from 
religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression 
that manifests a central tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels 
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.140 
The Tenth Circuit has held that to exceed the “substantial burden” threshold, 
governmental regulation must “significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or 
expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual beliefs.”141  
The Eighth Circuit found that a substantial burden was imposed when a person is 
compelled “by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct.”142   
The California Supreme Court has held that compliance with state fair housing 
laws does not constitute a substantial burden on religious free exercise.  In Smith v. 
Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, a landlord argued that her religious beliefs 
prevented her from renting apartments to unmarried couples.143  The court found that 
because the landlord’s religious beliefs did not require her to rent apartments, but 
merely to refrain from renting to unmarried couples, there was no substantial burden 
on her religious free exercise.144  The court noted that if the landlord did not wish to 
comply with the State’s housing anti-discrimination laws, that she had the 
opportunity to sell her rental properties and put the capital in other investments.145  
The court held that no religious exercise was burdened if the landlord followed the 
alternative course of placing her capital in another investment.146   
The Court in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n used an analysis for 
“substantial burden” that is a great deal stricter than the analysis required under the 
RLPA.  Under the RLPA, courts may view the choice of switching to another 
occupation to avoid anti-discrimination laws as too harsh, and determine that the 
burden is indeed substantial.147  Should courts determine that changing professions to 
avoid fair housing laws constitutes a substantial burden to a landlord’s free exercise 
                                                                
139Id. 
14080 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996). 
141See Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995). 
142See Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994). 
143913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). 
144Id. at 925. 
145Id. 
146Id. at 926. 
147Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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of religion, the RLPA would allow the landlord to engage in discriminatory housing 
practices if the practice was deemed a religious free exercise.148 
3.  Is the Governmental Interest in Eradicating Discrimination Compelling? 
The third part of the RLPA test requires that a government must have a 
compelling interest to justify the imposition of a substantial burden to an individual’s 
religious exercise.149  Courts are sharply split on this part of the RLPA test when 
deciding civil rights cases wherein a defendant has raised a religious liberty 
defense.150  In most cases, the government’s interest in eradicating racial and sex-
based discrimination has been found to meet the compelling interest standard.151  
However, because newly protected classes such as sexual orientation, disability, and 
marital status do not receive the same level of scrutiny as race and sex, it is more 
difficult to persuade courts that the governmental interest in preventing 
discrimination on such grounds is compelling.152  Courts are divided on whether or 
not preventing discrimination against these groups is a compelling governmental 
interest.153 
Courts have also been reluctant to find a compelling governmental interest in 
ending certain types of discrimination when other state or local laws discriminate 
against the class.  For example, laws forbidding fornication or sodomy have provided 
support for the conclusion that there is no compelling governmental interest in 
protecting against discrimination based on marital status or sexual orientation.154  In 
Cooper v. French, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “How can there be a 
compelling state interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute 
                                                                
148Id. 
149Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(b)(1). 
150Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
151See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the 
government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in 
education); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the state 
government’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens 
justifies the impact on the male members’ associational freedoms). 
152Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
153See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987) 
(holding that the District of Columbia’s interest in prohibiting educational institutions from 
denying equal access to benefits on the basis of sexual orientation is compelling); Swanner v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1993) (holding that Anchorage’s 
interest in prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing is compelling); But see Cooper 
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (holding that there was no compelling governmental 
interest in ending discrimination against unmarried couples). 
154Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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prohibiting it?”155  Likewise, courts have found that a government interest in ending 
discrimination based on marital status is not compelling in light of state and local 
laws which favor married couples.156  In this way, the RLPA’s “compelling 
governmental interest test” may make it more difficult for state and local 
governments to attempt to eradicate certain types of discrimination. 
4.  Are Uniformly Applied Anti-Discrimination Laws the Least Restrictive Means 
Available?  
The final part of the Religious Liberty Protection Act’s test is whether the 
challenged state or local law uses the least restrictive means to achieve the 
government’s compelling interest.157  There has been general agreement among state 
courts deciding this issue that uniform application of anti-discrimination laws is the 
least restrictive means for a government to achieve its compelling interest.158  In 
Minnesota ex. Rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., for example, the owners 
of a health club hired only employees whose religious beliefs were consistent with 
the owners’ religious beliefs, even though state law prohibited employment 
discrimination based on religion, sex, and marital status.159  The court found that “the 
state’s overriding compelling interest of eradicating discrimination based upon sex, 
race, marital status, or religion could be substantially frustrated if employers, 
professing as deep and sincere religious beliefs as those held by appellants, could 
discriminate against the protected classes.”160 
Because civil rights laws normally contain certain exemptions for religious 
organizations, proponents of RLPA will likely argue that the government cannot 
have a compelling interest in the uniform application of civil rights laws.161  A less 
restrictive means than the uniform application of civil rights laws may be available 
under the Religious Liberty Protection Act: granting exemptions from civil rights 
laws to individuals who hold sincere religious beliefs which forbid them from 
                                                                
155460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990). 
156See, e.g., Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (noting preferential treatment 
of married couples in employee life and health insurance benefits). 
157Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
158See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 280 n.9 (Alaska 
1993) (finding that “the most effective tool the state has for combating discrimination is to 
prohibit discrimination; these laws do exactly that.  Consequently, the means are narrowly 
tailored and there is no less restrictive alternative.”); See also Gay Rights Coalition v. 
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. App. 1987) (stating that “the District of Columbia’s 
overriding interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, if it is ever to be converted 
from aspiration to reality, requires that Georgetown equally distribute tangible benefits to the 
student groups.”). 
159370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985). 
160Id. at 853. 
161Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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obeying anti-discrimination laws.162  However, granting exemptions from civil rights 
laws may increase the number of people claiming a religious defense for their 
discriminatory actions.163  For this reason, uniform application of civil rights laws 
may be the least restrictive means to accomplish the goals of anti-discrimination 
laws.164 
The American Civil Liberties Union, which helped draft the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act, as well as the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, now opposes 
the bill unless an amendment makes it clear that religious claims cannot be used to 
defeat civil rights laws.165  The ACLU believes that unless Congress amends the 
RLPA to respond to the potential civil rights problems, or develops an alternative 
approach to addressing the problem of increasing protection for religious exercise 
against neutral state and local laws, the RLPA may provide a new defense to state 
and local civil rights claims made by persons who already receive the least protection 
from the courts and the federal government.166  The official ACLU position on the 
Religious Liberty Protection Act is that Congress should not pass the bill without 
ensuring that it will not deprive persons of their civil rights under state and local 
laws.167 
                                                                
162Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
163Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
164See Minnesota ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 
n.16 (Minn. 1985) (stating that if the court permitted the exemption in this case, other 
employees, “if they could demonstrate their beliefs were sincere and based on accepted 
theological concepts, would be permitted to discriminate contrary to the state’s public policy 
of affording equality of opportunity and equal access to public accommodation to all its 
citizens.  To permit such an exception would substantially emasculate the state’s public policy 
of ensuring civil rights for citizens.”); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 
(Mass. 1994) (finding that “the practical problems of administering a law with the exemption 
that the defendants seek may be shown to be such as to make the operation of such an 
exemption impractical.”); See also Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310, 323 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[W]hen recognizing the [free exercise] claim will 
predictably give rise to further claims, many of which undoubtedly will be fraudulent or 
exaggerated, the situation is different.  In that event the court must either recognize many such 
claims . . . or draw fine and searching distinctions among the various free exercise claimants.  
The latter course would raise serious constitutional questions with respect to the proper 
functioning of the courts in sensitive religious clause adjudication.”). 
165John Cloud, Law on Bended Knee, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 33. 
166Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
167Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/8
2000] THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT 409 
VI.  THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND CONGRESS’ POWER TO  
ENFORCE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION FIVE OF THE  
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment States: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.168 
Section Five, which is the final provision of the Amendment, states, “The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.”169   
A.  The Religious Liberty Protection Act’s Predecessor: The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act 
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act170 in direct 
response to Employment Division v. Smith, which held that a state need not 
demonstrate a “compelling interest” to justify laws of general application that 
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion.171  The RFRA essentially overturned 
Smith by requiring federal and state governments to meet the compelling interest test 
when substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion.172  The RFRA sought to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,173 and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened, and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by governement.174  The RFRA passed with broad support, 
                                                                
168U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
169U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
17042 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).  The RFRA stated, in relevant part, that “(1) the framers of 
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its 
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; (2) laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may 
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; (3) 
governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification; (4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise 
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; (5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior 
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty 
and competing prior governmental interests.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
171494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990). 
17242 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)-2(a) (1994). 
173374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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and was extremely popular.175  In enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
Congress relied on Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its power under 
Section Five of that Amendment, to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provision of [that] article.”176   
B.  City of Boerne v. Flores 
The case of City of Boerne v. Flores concerned the constitutionality of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.177  The city of Boerne, Texas passed an 
ordinance authorizing the city’s Historic Landmark Commission to set up an area of 
proposed historic landmarks and districts.178  Under the ordinance, the Commission 
had final approval of all construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a 
historic district.179  Shortly after the city passed this ordinance, St. Peter’s Catholic 
Church applied for a building permit to enlarge the church.180  Because the city’s 
Historic Landmark Commission found St. Peter’s to be located in a historic district, 
they denied the application.181  The Archbishop of the San Antonio Diocese then 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
challenging the denial of the permit.182  In his claim, the Archbishop relied on the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as one basis for relief from the city’s refusal to 
issue the building permit.183  The District Court concluded that the RFRA exceeded 
Congress’ power of enforcement under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.184  The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding the RFRA to 
be constitutional.185  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 
In deciding City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court looked at the language 
of the RFRA.  It noted that the RFRA prohibited the government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless the government can demonstrate that 
the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”186  The 
Court stated that in the RFRA, Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                                
175See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Overturns Religious Freedom Statute, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 1997 at A1. 
17642 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
177521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
178Id. at 512. 
179Id. 
180Id. Built in 1923, the church seated only about 230 worshippers, and was too small for 
its growing parish.  In order to meet the needs of the growing congregation, the Archbishop of 
San Antonio gave permission to the parish to enlarge the building. 
181Id. 
182Id. 
183City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
184Id. 
185Id. 
186521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (1994)). 
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enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA’s 
provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States.187  Because of the 
disagreement over whether or not the RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress’ 
Section Five enforcement power, the Court next analyzed in detail this portion of the 
respondent’s argument. 
The respondents in City of Boerne v. Flores argued that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act was a permissible enforcement legislation.188  They contended that 
Congress, through the RFRA, was only protecting by legislation one of the liberties 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the free exercise of 
religion, beyond what is necessary under Employment Division v. Smith.189  The 
respondents in Boerne further argued that Congress’ Section Five power was not 
limited to remedial or preventive legislation, but was a positive grant of legislative 
power to Congress.190  The Supreme Court agreed with the respondents that Congress 
has the power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the 
provisions of that Amendment, and that under that power Congress can enact 
legislation enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.191   
The Supreme Court next stated, however, that Congress’ power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment extended only to enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.192  The Court found the design of the Amendment and the 
text of Section Five to be inconsistent with the idea that Congress has the power to 
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.193  
The Court stated: 
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot 
be said to be enforcing the Clause.  Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.  It has been given the 
power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a 
constitutional violation.  Were it not so, what Congress would be 
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of 
[the Fourteenth Amendment].”194 
The Court noted the important distinction between Congressional measures 
which remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a 
                                                                
187City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516. 
188Id. at 517. 
189Id. 
190Id. at 518. 
191Id.  The Court noted that the “provisions of this article” to which § 5 refers include the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Congress’ power to enforce the Free 
Exercise Clause flows from the Court’s holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940) (holding that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”) 
192City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
193Id. 
194Id. 
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substantive change in the governing law.195  The Respondents contended that the 
RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress’ remedial or preventive power.196  It 
prevented and remedied laws which were enacted with the unconstitutional object of 
targeting religious beliefs and practices.197  The Court found this argument 
unconvincing, stating that although preventive rules are sometimes appropriate 
remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends 
to be achieved.198  The Court found this congruence lacking between the means and 
the ends of the RFRA.199  The Court found the RFRA to be a substantive change in 
constitutional protections rather than remedial or preventive legislation.200   
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the RFRA’s attempt to redefine the standard 
for judging constitutionally-protected religious freedoms as set forth in Employment 
Division v. Smith was an unconstitutional attempt to use Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to “control cases and controversies.”201  The Court held that 
Congress’ power under Section Five did not authorize it to pass “general legislation 
upon the rights of the citizens.”202  Furthermore, the Court held that Congress may 
not define the meaning of the First Amendment’s “free exercise” clause, and may not 
by general legislation impose its definition of free exercise on the States.203 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores was criticized by 
many.204   One commentator suggested that the Boerne opinion was “an almost 
ungracious disparagement of the purposes and objectives of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.”205  Supporters of the Boerne opinion argued that “RFRA tried to 
turn the First Amendment on its head” by saying that the Fourteenth Amendment 
gives Congress “a positive right” to protect free exercise of religion by “appropriate 
legislation.”206  The Boerne decision drove Senators Orin Hatch and Ted Kennedy, 
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and Representatives Charles Canady and Jerold Nadler to introduce new legislation 
that would reinstate the “compelling state interest” test.207  This legislation came to 
be known as the Religious Liberty Protection Act, and the constitutional 
justifications for it were Congress’ spending power and the commerce clause.208 
Like its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act is a quite controversial piece of legislation.  The spending 
power reliance in the RLPA is sure to cause problems.  The only way for a state or 
local government to avoid RLPA’s mandate would be to forgo all federal financial 
assistance.  Under South Dakota v. Dole, this can be viewed as a “financial 
inducement so coercive that it passes the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion.”209  Such an inducement was held unconstitutional in that case.210  The 
RLPA gives states only two options: take federal funds with the RLPA liability, or 
take no funds at all.  These two options may easily be viewed as having reached the 
point where pressure turns into compulsion.  The commerce clause justification for 
the RLPA is also flawed.  United States v. Lopez211 precludes the RLPA’s reliance on 
the commerce clause.  The commerce clause is a poor way to justify religious 
protection, as those religious practices with little or no commercial component would 
not be protected.212  Furthermore, there will be many cases in which the effect on 
commerce can’t be proven, and will fall outside of the RLPA protection.213   
The Religious Liberty Protection Act also poses an Establishment Clause 
problem.  By protecting religions that affect commerce, and not protecting those 
religions that do not, the RLPA is, in fact, an Establishment of religion.  It favors one 
religion over another.  As the Supreme Court pointed out in Larson v. Valente, “the 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another.”214  By protecting religions with a 
commercial component, and not protecting religions with little or no commercial 
component, the RLPA is “officially preferr[ing]” one denomination over another, in 
violation of Larson v. Valente.215   
Claims under the Religious Liberty Protection Act may be used to defeat civil 
rights.  Defendants in civil rights cases will likely be able to use religious free 
exercise claims as a defense under the RLPA.  Landlords may be exempt from fair 
housing laws by claiming that their religious beliefs prohibit them from renting to 
unmarried couples or homosexuals.  The American Civil Liberties Union, an initial 
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author of the Religious Liberty Protection Act, now opposes the bill unless an 
amendment is added making it clear that religious claims may not be used to defeat 
civil rights laws.216   
In its last attempt to pass legislation to protect religion, Congress was overruled 
by the Supreme Court.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the predecessor of 
the Religious Liberty Protection Act, was Congress’ first attempt to protect religious 
exercise.217  The RFRA was premised on different constitutional grounds than the 
RLPA, but its goals were much the same.218  In 1997, the Supreme Court struck 
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.219  The 
Religious Liberty Protection Act appears to be an attempt by Congress to pass almost 
identical legislation using different constitutional grounds. 
If it is passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President, the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act is sure to face a Supreme Court challenge, just as the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did.  The RLPA is likely to create unintended 
results, such as giving official preference to certain religions at the expense of others, 
forcing states to forgo federal financial assistance, and adversely impacting the 
enforcement of civil rights laws.  The Religious Liberty Protection Act places a 
heavy burden on governments, which are forced to prove a “compelling 
governmental interest” for any act or measure that may be viewed as burdening 
religion, even in the case of laws of general applicability.  Furthermore, the RLPA 
gives religions a legal tool to fight nearly every law that a state or local government 
might pass.  A possible solution to the problems sure to surface if the RLPA passes 
the Senate and is signed into law is for Congress to focus on individual areas where 
burdens on religious conduct exist, rather than passing sweeping legislation such as 
the Religious Liberty Protection Act.  As the RLPA stands now, a whole host of 
challenges are likely to be brought should the legislation become law, including 
challenges to the commerce and spending constitutional justifications for the bill.  As 
one constitutional scholar has noted of the RLPA, “This bill is an unvarnished 
request from religious lobbyists to permit religious individuals and institutions to 
break a wide variety of laws.”220 
JENNIFER DORTON 
                                                                
216Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of 
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
21742 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
218Both the RFRA and the RLPA attempt to revive the “compelling governmental interest” 
standard in lieu of the standard set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990).  Both prohibit state or local governments from substantially burdening religious 
exercise unless the government has a compelling interest and is using the least restrictive 
means to accomplish that interest. 
219521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
220Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A. 
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/8
